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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 
1996 bars many claims against internet service providers. See 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c). But Section 230 does not bar intellectual 
property claims. § 230(e)(2). The question presented in this 
appeal is whether a Philadelphia newscaster’s state-law claims 
for violating her right of publicity are precluded by § 230. 
Because those claims are encompassed within the intellectual 
property carve-out, § 230(e)(2), we hold they are not 
precluded. 
I 
Appellant Karen Hepp has worked in the news industry 
her entire adult life. Presently, she hosts FOX 29’s Good Day 
Philadelphia. As is often the case for television personalities, 
Hepp’s professional success as a newscaster depends in part on 
her reputation and social media following. She has built an 
“excellent reputation as a moral and upstanding community 
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leader” and has amassed a sizeable social media following. See 
App. 59–61. So Hepp’s endorsement can be valuable. 
Naturally, that value depends on her ability to control the use 
of her likeness.  
In 2018, Hepp was told by coworkers that her 
photograph was making its way around the internet. The image 
depicts Hepp in a convenience store, smiling in the center of 
the frame’s foreground. But the photograph was taken without 
Hepp’s knowledge or consent. She knows neither the 
convenience store’s location nor how the image was posted 
online. And she never authorized the image to be used in online 
advertisements for erectile dysfunction and dating websites.  
Hepp’s allegations included two sets of posts featuring 
her photograph. She alleged each violated her right of publicity 
under Pennsylvania law. 
The first post—which was an advertisement to a dating 
app, FirstMet—appeared on Facebook, which is one of the 
world’s largest social media companies. The advertisement 
used Hepp’s image to promote its dating service. And it 
encouraged Facebook users to “meet and chat with single 
women near you.” 
Second, a Reddit thread linked to an Imgur post of the 
photo. Reddit is an online forum that allows users to create 
communities organized around topics. Within each 
community, users can start conversations by making an initial 
post. Other users can note their approval by “upvoting” the 
post. See generally https://www.redditinc.com/; 
https://www.reddithelp.com/hc/en-us/categories/200073949-
Reddit-101. Imgur is a photo sharing website where users share 
digital images. See generally https://imgurinc.com/. In this 
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case, someone uploaded Hepp’s image to Imgur. Then a Reddit 
user posted a link to the Imgur post. The Reddit post spurred 
indecent user commentary and was upvoted over one hundred 
times.  
Hepp sued Facebook, Reddit, and Imgur. The 
complaint, as amended, alleges two state-law claims: one for 
violating Pennsylvania’s right of publicity statute, 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 8316, and the other for violating its common 
law. The companies each moved to dismiss the amended 
complaint. The District Court dismissed Hepp’s case with 
prejudice, holding all three companies were entitled to § 230 
immunity. The Court held the § 230(e)(2) limitation—which 
prevents § 230 from affecting “any law pertaining to 
intellectual property”—did not apply to violations of state law.  
Hepp appealed. And Imgur and Reddit filed a joint 
cross-appeal to challenge personal jurisdiction.  
II 
The District Court, exercising diversity jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, dismissed Hepp’s amended complaint 
with prejudice. So our jurisdiction lies under § 1291, and our 
review is plenary. See Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 
986 F.3d 261, 265 (3d Cir. 2021).  
III 
We begin with personal jurisdiction. Facebook 
conceded it was amenable to suit in the District Court. But 
Reddit and Imgur claimed the District Court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over them. We agree. Applying the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial 
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District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021), we hold the District 
Court did not have personal jurisdiction over Reddit or Imgur. 
Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. General 
jurisdiction extends to all claims against a defendant and exists 
where a company is “essentially at home.” Id. at 1024. Because 
none of the companies are at home in Pennsylvania, we turn to 
the Supreme Court’s specific jurisdiction doctrine, which 
extends only to particular claims. Id. 
There are two prongs to the specific jurisdiction 
analysis. First, there must be purposeful availment: minimum 
contacts with the forum state that show the defendant took a 
deliberate act reaching out to do business in that state. Id. at 
1024–25. Second, the contacts must give rise to—or relate to—
plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 1025. Imgur and Reddit concede that 
the first prong is satisfied here. Oral Argument at 47:28–47:34. 
So we focus on the second.  
For the contacts to satisfy the second prong, there must 
be “a strong ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and 
the litigation.’” Id. at 1028 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales 
de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). Here, 
that connection is too weak.  
Consider the strong connection in Ford Motor. That 
case involved products liability suits stemming from car 
accidents in Minnesota and Montana. Id. at 1022. The contacts 
between those states and the company were legion. By “every 
means imaginable” Ford urged state residents to buy the types 
of cars in the accidents. Id. at 1028. The company 
“systematically served a market in Montana and Minnesota for 
the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and 
injured them in those States.” Id. So there was the requisite 
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strong relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation. Id. 
In contrast, Hepp’s allegations focus on how Imgur and 
Reddit purposefully availed themselves of the Pennsylvania 
market. But those contacts do not relate to this litigation. Hepp 
alleges Imgur and Reddit targeted their advertising business to 
Pennsylvania. And she alleges Imgur has an online 
merchandise store that sells products to Pennsylvanians. 
Finally, she points to Reddit’s premium membership business 
and an online community organized around Philadelphia. But 
none of these contacts forms a strong connection to the 
misappropriation of Hepp’s likeness. Hepp did not allege the 
merchandise featured her photo. Nor did she allege Imgur and 
Reddit used her likeness to sell advertising. Finally, she did not 
claim the photo was taken, uploaded, or hosted in 
Pennsylvania.  
In sum, the alleged contacts do not relate to 
misappropriation, and the alleged misappropriation does not 
relate to any of the contacts. Because Hepp failed to establish 
the strong connection present in Ford Motor, we hold the 
District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Imgur and 
Reddit.1 
 
1 Hepp also named a Czech company, WGCZ, in connection 
with a pornographic website that hosted her image after a user 
posted it to an illicit gallery. The District Court granted 
WGCZ’s motion to dismiss because it did not operate the 
website during the relevant time. Hepp concedes WGCZ did 
not run the pornography website at issue. Oral Argument at 




With Facebook as the only remaining party to this 
appeal, we consider whether it is immune under § 230.  
A 
Passed in 1996, Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act was intended to promote the internet. See 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b). It specifically sought to preserve “the 
vibrant and competitive free market”—“unfettered by Federal 
or State regulation.” § 230(b)(2). The Act also promoted 
filtering technology and the vigorous enforcement of criminal 
obscenity laws. § 230(b)(5). In essence, Congress fostered a 
largely unregulated free market online while snuffing out 
certain objectionable content. 
Section 230(c) strikes the balance. It provides “Good 
Samaritan” protection, which enables “blocking and screening 
of offensive material” as follows: 
(1) TREATMENT OF PUBLISHER OR 
SPEAKER. No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of 
 
establish personal jurisdiction, and the District Court correctly 
held it lacked personal jurisdiction over WGCZ. The District 
Court also concluded § 230 barred Hepp’s claims, so it denied 
her leave to add the appropriate website owner. As explained 
below, we disagree with the District Court about § 230. See 
infra Part IV. So while Hepp’s suit against WGCZ was 
properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, we will vacate the 
District Court’s decision denying leave to amend. 
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any information provided by another 
information content provider. 
(2) CIVIL LIABILITY. No provider or 
user of an interactive computer 
service shall be held liable on account 
of— 
(A) any action . . . to restrict 
access to . . . objectionable 
. . . [material]; or 
(B) any action taken to enable 
. . . the technical means to 
restrict access to material 
described in paragraph [A]. 
§ 230(c). This provision bars attempts to treat websites as 
publishers or speakers of content posted by others. Id. And it 
encourages companies to host and moderate third-party content 
by immunizing them from certain moderation decisions. Id. In 
other words, it forgoes some publisher liability and paves the 
way for service providers to make their own moderation 
decisions. 
Lest the liability provisions in § 230(c) be read too 
broadly, however, the Act also carves out five limitations in 
§ 230(e). Subsection (e) ensures several legal domains remain 
unaffected by § 230(c). Most relevant here, § 230 has “[n]o 
effect on intellectual property.” § 230(e)(2). Indeed, “[n]othing 
in [§ 230] shall be construed to limit or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.” Id. Similarly, § 230(c) does 
not affect federal criminal law, communications privacy law, 
or sex trafficking law. § (e)(1), (4), (5). Among these 
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limitations, state law is mentioned several times. For instance, 
in the communications privacy and sex trafficking domains, 
“similar” or coextensive state laws also fall outside § 230(c)’s 
scope. See § (e)(4), (5). Finally, the Act also provides a general 
state law limitation, stating consistent state laws are not 
affected. See § 230(e)(3). In sum, § 230(e) cabins the reach of 
the Act’s liability provisions. 
This appeal turns on whether § 230(c) makes Facebook 
immune or whether § 230(e)(2) places Hepp’s claims outside 
§ 230(c)’s reach. We resolve that issue in two steps. First, we 
consider whether § 230(e)(2) can apply to any state law claims. 
We then turn to whether § 230(e)(2) applies to Hepp’s 
statutory claim.  
B 
1 
In the twenty-five years since the Communications 
Decency Act was passed, there are precious few cases 
interpreting § 230’s intellectual property provision. The first 
noteworthy case is Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. 
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007). There, a company 
sued internet message board providers alleging that some posts 
contained “false, misleading” content about the company’s 
financial prospects. See id. at 415–16. The suit alleged 
violations of federal law, as well as trade name dilution in 
violation of Florida law. Id. at 417. The First Circuit treated the 
Florida dilution claim separately because “[c]laims based on 
intellectual property laws are not subject to Section 230 
immunity.” Id. at 422–23 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)). As to 
the merits of the state-law claim, the court reasoned that 
“[t]rademark injury arises from an improper association 
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between the mark and [someone else’s] products or 
services”—not from “criticism” leading to reputational harm. 
See id. at 423. Ultimately, the court held “that even though 
Section 230 immunity does not apply, the claim was properly 
dismissed as a matter of [Florida] trademark law” “because of 
the serious First Amendment issues that would be raised by 
allowing [Plaintiff’s] claim.” See id. at 423 & n.7. But that 
decision was necessary only because the court held § 230(e)(2) 
preserved the state law claim. 
Soon after the First Circuit announced its decision in 
Lycos, the Ninth Circuit went the other way in Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). There, a website 
operator alleged violations of federal law and a state right of 
publicity law. Id. at 1108. The district court dismissed the 
complaint and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that 
federal intellectual property’s scope was more established 
compared to state laws. Id. at 1118. And it explained the Act’s 
policy goal—to insulate the internet from regulation—would 
be hindered if federal immunity varied based on state laws. Id. 
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, § 230(e)(2) includes only “federal 
intellectual property.” Id. at 1119 (emphasis added). 
Another notable case is Atlantic Recording Corp. v. 
Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
There, record companies brought copyright claims under both 
state and federal law. See id. at 694 & n.5. The district court 
found the statute’s text was clear. Id. at 703. It emphasized that 
Congress specified whether local, state, or federal law applied 
four times in subsection (e): once discussing federal criminal 
law, § (e)(1); twice in the general state law provision, § (e)(3); 
and again in the communications law context, § (e)(4). Id. The 
court held that “if Congress wanted the phrase ‘any law 
pertaining to intellectual property’ to actually mean ‘any 
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federal law pertaining to intellectual property,’ it knew how to 
make that clear, but chose not to.” Id. Indeed, when Congress 
added the sex trafficking provision to the limitations in § (e), it 
referenced state laws twice more. See Allow States and 
Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, § 4(a), 
Pub L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018) (adding 
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)). 
With those precedents in mind, we turn to the parties’ 
arguments. 
2 
In dismissing Hepp’s amended complaint, the District 
Court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s approach, holding that 
§ 230(e)(2)’s limitation applies only to federal intellectual 
property. Facebook asks us to affirm that holding on three 
bases: the text and structure of § 230(e); the statute’s own 
policy provision, § 230(b); and practical policy reasons.  
Facebook’s appeal to text and structure rightly urges us 
to read § 230 as an integrated whole. It suggests § 230(e) 
makes federal limitations the default and includes state laws 
only when specified. In other words, § 230(e)’s limitations are 
“directed to certain federal statutes and include state laws only 
where they are coextensive with federal law.” Facebook Br. 17. 
Because state-law rights of publicity do not mirror an 
analogous federal law, Facebook argues Hepp’s claim is not 
included in § 230(e)(2)’s intellectual property limitation.  
Hepp counters that her claims arise under state law 
“pertaining to intellectual property,” so § 230(c) cannot block 




In our view, Facebook’s interpretation strays too far 
from the natural reading of § 230(e)(2). We disagree that “any 
law pertaining to intellectual property” should be read to mean 
“any federal law pertaining to intellectual property.” To 
support this “federal” reading, Facebook points to the statute’s 
structure. But the structural evidence it cites cuts both ways. 
Facebook is correct that the explicit references to state law in 
subsection (e) are coextensive with federal laws. But those 
references also suggest that when Congress wanted to cabin the 
interpretation about state law, it knew how to do so—and did 
so explicitly. Because the evidence cuts both ways, the 
structure does not change the natural meaning. So the text and 
structure tell us that § 230(e)(2) can apply to federal and state 
laws that pertain to intellectual property. 
Facebook also points to the policy enacted as part of 
§ 230. As the company would have it, “Congress enacted 
Section 230 to avoid subjecting internet service providers to a 
web of inconsistent, ‘fettering’ state regulations like the laws 
governing rights of publicity.” Facebook Br. 20–21. In support 
of this argument, Facebook focuses on § 230(b)(2). That 
provision seeks “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.” § 230(b)(2). Facebook contends that because 
rights of publicity vary from state to state, increasing those 
protections would require censorship, limit free speech, and 
impair the online marketplace.  
Facebook’s premise is right: Congress enacted a pro-
free-market policy. But its desired conclusion does not 
necessarily follow. Section 230’s policy goals do not erase 
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state intellectual property rights as against internet service 
providers. Facebook errs by downplaying the role of property 
in markets. After all, state property laws—along with contract 
laws—enable “the resulting formation of effective markets.” 
Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1029. Because state property rights 
can facilitate market exchange, interpreting the § 230(e)(2) 
limitation to include state intellectual property laws tracks 
Congress’s pro-free-market goal. So the enacted policies do 
not require an alternate reading.  
Third, Facebook offers policy arguments independent 
of the statute’s text. According to Facebook, our reading would 
increase uncertainty about the precise contours of immunity in 
cases involving state intellectual property law. See Facebook 
Br. 29 (citing Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119 n.5). But policy 
considerations cannot displace the text. For that reason, other 
courts have rejected such considerations, at least implicitly. In 
Lycos, the First Circuit decided the case on state law grounds 
because “Section 230 immunity does not apply.” 478 F.3d at 
423 n.7. And in Atlantic Recording, the district court took a 
similar approach. Well over a decade has passed since those 
cases were decided, yet neither Facebook nor its amici provide 
evidence that the rulings created the disarray they now predict.  
Even if we considered policy outside the statute’s text, 
it too could cut the other way. For example, if likeness interests 
are disregarded on the internet, the incentives to build an 
excellent commercial reputation for endorsements may 
diminish. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 
433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (explaining the economic theory 
underlying the right of publicity). That would cut against the 
statute’s explicit policy objectives because information 
provided by promotional advertisements can enhance market 
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efficiency and vibrancy. So these policy arguments do not 
carry the day for Facebook either. 
The parties present a clear split of persuasive authority. 
Facebook and its amici offer arguments based on the statute’s 
text and policy considerations. But there are strong textual and 
policy arguments to the contrary. Because we adhere to the 
most natural reading of § 230(e)(2)’s text, we hold that 
§ 230(e)(2) is not limited to federal laws. Simply put, a state 
law can be a “law pertaining to intellectual property,” too. 
C 
Having held the § 230(e)(2) limitation applies to state 
intellectual property law, we turn to whether Hepp’s statutory 
cause of action against Facebook constitutes such a claim.  
1 
Facebook argues the right of publicity is rooted in 
privacy. But it acknowledges the right has been categorized as 
“both a ‘privacy right’ . . . and a ‘property right’.” Facebook 
Br. 24–25 (quotation omitted). Amici supporting Facebook 
take a different tack. They argue we should read “any law 
pertaining to intellectual property” to “embrace its traditional 
core”—exclusively federal copyright and patent law. EFF Br. 
8 & n.5 (excluding trademarks). These amici also warn us of 
the “parade of horribles,” EFF Br. 19, that would ensue should 
we adopt Hepp’s interpretation, especially limitations on free 
speech.  
For her part, Hepp contends the right to publicity is an 
intellectual property right. See Hepp Br. 11. And she argues 
that she “has dedicated considerable time, effort and money 
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into building her brand.” Hepp Br. 17. Her amicus adds that 
state courts have long recognized individuals have property 
interests in their personas. They cite a 1907 case involving the 
legendary Thomas Edison. SAG Br. 19. There, the New Jersey 
court confirmed Edison could enjoin the use of his picture as 
an endorsement for a product he did not sell. See Edison v. 
Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907). The 
court reasoned there was no distinction between the intellectual 
property protections afforded a person’s name and trademark-
like protections for likenesses used on a label. See id. 
2 
With these arguments in mind, we return to the statute’s 
text. “Nothing in [§ 230] shall be construed to limit or expand 
any law pertaining to intellectual property.” § 230(e)(2). So to 
decide whether Hepp’s statutory claim against Facebook falls 
within § 230’s intellectual property limitation, we must first 
establish whether it arises from a “law pertaining to intellectual 
property.” That requires us to determine the meaning of the 
phrase “intellectual property.” To do so, we turn to several 
sources. 
For starters, Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“intellectual property” to include “publicity rights.” See 
Intellectual Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019); accord id. (7th ed. 1999). But not every dictionary does. 
For instance, Ballentine’s defines the term as “those property 
rights which result from the physical manifestation of original 
thought.” Intellectual Property, BALLENTINE’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1968). Absent unanimity about the 
meaning of “intellectual property,” we survey dictionary 
definitions. See infra Appendices A and B. See generally 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 417 
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(2012) (explaining “comparative weighing of dictionaries is 
often necessary”).  
We begin by noting that “intellectual property” is best 
understood as a compound term—not a generic two-word 
phrase—because both legal and lay dictionaries treat it as such. 
See infra Appendices A and B. So we do not combine the 
definitions of “intellectual” and “property” in isolation; we 
interpret the compound term as a unified whole. 
Second, legal dictionaries take precedence here. See 
infra Appendix A. Section 230(e) addresses the Act’s impact 
on other laws. Because the term is used in a legal sense, the 
proper definition of “intellectual property” is the term’s 
ordinary legal meaning. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 73.  
Our survey of legal dictionaries reveals “intellectual 
property” has a recognized meaning which includes the right 
of publicity. This conclusion follows from several 
observations.  
First, two of the legal dictionaries explicitly list the right 
of publicity as an intellectual property right. See infra 
Appendix A (Black’s and McCarthy’s). These dictionaries are 
especially apt. Black’s is renowned, and McCarthy’s directly 
addresses the subject. A third legal dictionary, Bouvier’s, 
provides more support. It sets forth a test that Pennsylvania’s 
right of publicity statute satisfies because the statute grants 
people monopolies in their likenesses. The statute also 
provides for property-like relief, including the ability to obtain 
damages and injunctions against trespassers. Compare 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 8316(a) (allowing for damages and injunctions 
when one’s monopoly over her likeness is infringed), with 
infra Appendix A (Bouvier’s test, requiring the same). In sum, 
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these definitions provide strong evidence that the term 
“intellectual property” includes Pennsylvania’s statutory right 
of publicity. 
Along with that explicit evidence, the legal definitions 
provide implicit support as well. For instance, one definition 
does not mention the right of publicity—but it includes 
trademark. See infra Appendix A (Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage). And that inclusion implies the right to publicity by 
analogy. Cf. Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562.  
In Zacchini, the Supreme Court explained the right of 
publicity is an individual property right that is “closely 
analogous to . . . patent and copyright” because it focuses “on 
the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors 
and [has] little to do with protecting feelings or reputation.” Id. 
at 573. That focus also fosters market function by preventing 
the “unjust enrichment by the theft of goodwill.” See id. at 
575–76. And just as the right is “closely analogous” to patent 
and copyright, so too for trademark. Like the right to publicity, 
trademarks secure commercial goodwill. USPTO v. 
Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2302 (2020). Trademarks also 
foster the marketplace because they protect consumers’ ability 
to distinguish between competitors. Id. So the right of publicity 
and trademark are close analogues.2  
 
2 For an academic account, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from 
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164, 1190 (2006) 
(contending trademark law “is by far the closest analogy to the 
right of publicity”). 
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And this analogy has been recognized in the courts for 
over a century. For example, a New Jersey court in Edison 
analogized the right in one’s likeness to trademark. 67 A. at 
393–94. That same year, a federal court granted an injunction 
to stop the “deceptive use of the Emperor Franz Josef’s name 
and portrait” because it falsely implied his endorsement. See 
Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass’n, 154 F. 911, 
913 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1907). More recently, the Florida Supreme 
Court explained the harm caused by a right to publicity 
violation is that “it associates the individual’s name or . . . 
personality with something else.” Tyne v. Time Warner Ent. 
Co., 901 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 2005) (cleaned up). Because 
trademark and the right to publicity are analogues, the legal 
definition including trademark also supports including the right 
of publicity as “intellectual property.”  
Like the legal dictionaries, many lay dictionaries 
explicitly include trademark. See Appendix B. So they too 
favor including the right to publicity within “intellectual 
property.” It is true that a handful of definitions fail to mention 
trademark. See infra Appendix A (Ballentine’s); see also infra 
Appendix B (American Heritage and Merriam Webster). But 
those three dictionaries are a distinct minority compared to the 
majority view that includes the right to publicity either 
explicitly or by analogy. And the statute’s context favors 
adopting the majority view. Dictionary definitions tend to 
“state[] the core meaning of a term,” omitting the “periphery.” 
SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 418. And here, statutory context 
clarifies we should include the periphery. Section 230(e)(2) 
uses the modifiers “any” and “pertaining to”—“any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.” So not only are core 
intellectual property laws included, but so are laws pertaining 
to the subject. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 
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218–19 (2008) (“any”); cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (“relating to”). And not some of 
them—any of them. Thus the term’s statutory context confirms 
our holding. 
In conclusion, we hold that Hepp’s statutory claim 
against Facebook arises out of a law pertaining to intellectual 
property. For that reason, the § 230(e)(2) limit applies, and 
Facebook is not immune under § 230(c). So we will reverse the 
District Court’s order dismissing Hepp’s amended complaint 
against Facebook with prejudice. 
D 
We close by emphasizing the narrowness of our 
holding. First, it does not threaten free speech. Hepp’s statutory 
claim against Facebook clarifies the point. She alleges her 
likeness was used to promote a dating service in an 
advertisement. And she claims that misappropriated the effort 
she spent to build a valuable reputation, so it could confuse 
consumers by suggesting she endorses the service. Again, the 
analogy to trademark is striking. Just as a counterfeit item can 
misappropriate a trademark owner’s goodwill, so too might the 
unauthorized use of Hepp’s image in the ad. Further, both 
misappropriations could create consumer confusion and 
undercut efficient incentives. In this way, trademark claims 
typically avoid violating free speech by addressing misleading 
commercial speech. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 
542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008). So too for Hepp’s 
statutory claim against Facebook. Thus, Hepp’s statutory claim 
against Facebook is about the commercial effect on her 
intellectual property, not about protected speech. 
22 
Second, our holding does not open the floodgates. 
Pennsylvania’s statute is limited. For instance, it provides a 
right of publicity cause of action only for those whose valuable 
interest in their likeness “is developed through the investment 
of time, effort, and money.” 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8316(e). 
And we express no opinion as to whether other states’ rights of 
publicity qualify as intellectual property as a matter of federal 
law. 
Third, having resolved the appeal on statutory grounds, 
we offer no opinion about the Pennsylvania common law 
claim. Facebook and Hepp briefed that issue in the District 
Court, but neither party focused on it here. So it is best left to 
the District Court on remand.  
* * * 
Section 230 does not preclude claims based on state 
intellectual property laws. Hepp’s statutory claim against 
Facebook fits that bill. For that reason, we will reverse in part 
the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint with 
prejudice as to her statutory claim against Facebook. But the 
District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the other 
parties, so they should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
And we will vacate the District Court’s orders regarding leave 
to amend and Hepp’s common law claim against Facebook. 
Finally, we will remand for further proceedings consistent with 




1. A category of intangible rights protecting 
commercially valuable products of the human 
intellect. • The category comprises primarily 
trademark, copyright, and patent rights, but also 
includes trade-secret rights, publicity rights, 
moral rights, and rights against unfair 
competition. 
2. A commercially valuable product of the 
human intellect, in a concrete or abstract form, 
such as a copyrightable work, a protectable 
trademark, a patentable invention, or a trade 
secret. 
Intellectual Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th 
ed. 1999). 
1. A category of intangible rights protecting 
commercially valuable products of the human 
intellect. • The category comprises primarily 
trademark, copyright, and patent rights, but also 
includes trade-secret rights, publicity rights, 
moral rights, and rights against unfair 
competition. . . . . 
2. A commercially valuable product of the 
human intellect, in a concrete or abstract form, 
such as a copyrightable work, a protectable 
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trademark, a patentable invention, or a trade 
secret. 
Intellectual Property, id. (8th ed. 2004); id. (9th ed. 
2009); id. (10th ed. 2014); id. (11th ed. 2019). 
Those property rights which result from the 
physical manifestation of original thought. 
Intellectual Property, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(3d ed. 1969). 
Intellectual property comprises two 
subdivisions: industrial property and copyright. 
Industrial property includes patents, inventions, 
trademarks, and industrial designs. Copyrights 
are property rights in literary, musical, artistic, 
photographic, and film works as well as in maps 
and technical drawings. 
Intellectual Property, DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL 
USAGE (2d ed. 1995) 
Protection under the law for interests in creations 
and inventions. Intellectual property is the whole 
set of intangible rights that authors, inventors, 
and other creators have in the items they write, 
invent, or create. To have intellectual property in 
a thing is to have an effective monopoly on its 
use, such that the property rights holder may 
enjoin or recover from others who infringe on the 
rights through unfair duplication or wrongful 
use. Intellectual property in anything is usually 
limited in time, although the lengths of time and 
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manner of calculation vary dramatically among 
and within the categories. 
Intellectual property is usually divided among 
three categories: copyright, patent, and 
trademark. In the United States, each is the 
province of federal regulation, as well as the 
common law. There is also a growing field of 
international law regulating intellectual property 
both as a field of international agreements unto 
itself and as an aspect of the regulation of trade. 
Intellectual Property, THE WOLTERS KLUWER 
BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (2012). 
[patent—trademark—unfair competition—
copyright—trade secret—moral rights] Certain 
creations of the human mind that are given the 
legal aspects of a property right. “Intellectual 
property” is an all-encompassing term now 
widely used to designate as a group all of the 
following fields of law: patent, trademark, unfair 
competition, copyright, trade secret, moral 
rights, and the right of publicity. 
Intellectual Property, MCCARTHY’S DESK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1991) 
(square brackets in the original). 
B 
1. Any of various products of the intellect that 
have commercial value, including copyrighted 
property such as literary or artistic works, and 
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ideational property, such as patents, business 
methods, and industrial processes. 
2. The set of rights protecting such works and 
property from unlawful infringement. 
Intellectual Property, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011). 
A product of the intellect that has commercial 
value, including copyrighted property such as 
literary or artistic works, and ideational property, 
such as patents, appellations of origin, business 
methods, and industrial processes. 
Intellectual Property, id. (4th ed. 2009) 
Law. Property that results from original creative 
thought, as patents and trademarks. 
Intellectual Property, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S SCHOOL 
AND OFFICE DICTIONARY (1999). 
Property (as an idea, invention, or process) that 
derives from the work of the mind of intellect; 
also: an application, right, or registration relating 
to this. 
Intellectual Property, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). 
A general name for property (such as patents, 
trademarks, and copyright material) which is the 
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product of invention or creativity, and which 
does not exist in a tangible, physical form. 
Intellectual Property, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 
1989). 
Property (such as patents, trademarks, and 
copyright material) which is the product of 
invention or creativity, and does not exist in a 
tangible, physical form. 
Intellectual Property, id. (3d ed. 2010). 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
I concur in Section III (and Footnote 1 to the extent it 
affirms the District Court’s dismissal of the claims against 
WGCZ for lack of personal jurisdiction) of the majority 
opinion.  However, I must respectfully dissent from Section 
IV of the opinion.  I believe that the “intellectual property” 
exception or exclusion to immunity under § 230(e)(2) of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 
230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit 
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property”), is 
limited to federal intellectual property laws (i.e., federal 
patent, copyright, and trademark laws) and—at most—state 
laws only where they are co-extensive with such federal laws.  
Because Hepp’s statutory and common law “right of 
publicity” claims under Pennsylvania law are clearly not co-
extensive with federal intellectual property laws, the 
exception does not apply, and Facebook (as well as NKL 
Associates, S.R.O. (“NKL”)) are entitled to immunity.1       
 
Initially, the majority indicates that there is a circuit 
split between the First and Ninth Circuits regarding the scope 
of § 230(e)(2).  However, there is no existing split in the 
 
1 While Facebook argues that the exception applies to 
federal and co-extensive state intellectual property laws, 
Imgur, Reddit, and WGCZ contend that the exception only 
applies to federal claims (and Amicus EFF contends that it is 
limited to patent and copyright claims).  Because the claims at 
issue here are not co-extensive with federal intellectual 
property laws, I need not—and do not—decide which 




circuits on this issue.  On the contrary, it is the majority that 
creates such a split.   
 
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th 
Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit did conclude that the intellectual 
property exception “includes only ‘federal intellectual 
property.’”  (Majority Opinion at 12 (quoting Perfect 10, 488 
F.3d at 1119).)  The circuit court succinctly and persuasively 
explained why it construed “the term ‘intellectual property’ to 
mean ‘federal intellectual property’”: 
 
The CDA does not contain an express 
definition of “intellectual property,” and there 
are many types of claims in both state and 
federal law which may—or may not—be 
characterized as “intellectual property” claims.  
While the scope of federal intellectual property 
law is relatively well-established, state laws 
protecting “intellectual property,” however 
defined, are by no means uniform.  Such laws 
may bear various names, provide for varying 
causes of action and remedies, and have varying 
purposes and policy goals.  Because material on 
a website may be viewed across the Internet, 
and thus in more than one state at a time, 
permitting the reach of any particular state’s 
definition of intellectual property to dictate the 
contours of this federal immunity would be 
contrary to Congress’s expressed goal of 
insulating the development of the Internet from 
the various state-law regimes.  See 47 U.S.C. § 
230(a) and (b); see also [Batzel v. Smith, 333 




“courts construing § 230 have recognized as 
critical in applying the statute the concern that 
lawsuits could threaten the ‘freedom of speech 
in the new and burgeoning Internet medium’” 
(quoting [Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 
327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)])).  In the absence of a 
definition from Congress, we construe the term 
“intellectual property” to mean “federal 
intellectual property.”  
  
Id. at 1118-19 (footnote omitted).  Accordingly, the Perfect 
10 court determined that the defendants “are eligible for CDA 
immunity for all of the state claims [i.e., unfair competition, 
false advertising, and right of publicity claims] raised” by the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 1119.   
 
 The majority also states that the First Circuit “held § 
230(e)(2) preserved the state law claim.”  (Id. (discussing 
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 
(1st Cir. 2007)).)  Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit 
simply stated without any further discussion (or even 
acknowledgement that there could be an issue regarding the 
scope of the statutory exception) that:   
 
Claims based on intellectual property 
laws are not subject to Section 230 immunity.  
See [§ 230(e)(2)] (“Nothing in this section shall 
be construed to limited or expand any law 
pertaining to intellectual property.”); see also 
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 
2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the 
“plain language of Section 230(e)(2) precludes 




claim for trademark infringement).   
 
Universal Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 422-23.  It then noted that, 
while the district court held that the claim was in effect a 
defamation claim and that defendants thereby would be 
shielded from the claim by CDA immunity, “[w]e reason 
somewhat differently, holding that even though Section 230 
immunity does not apply, the claim was properly dismissed as 
a matter of trademark law.”  Id. at 423 n.7.     
 
The Ninth Circuit itself addressed Universal 
Communication in disposing of the plaintiff’s unsuccessful 
petition for rehearing.  Initially, it noted that “neither party in 
that case raised the question of whether state law counts as 
‘intellectual property’ for purposes of § 230 and the court 
seems to simply have assumed that it does.”  Perfect 10, 488 
F.3d at 1119 n.5.  The Perfect 10 court further observed that 
“Universal Communication demonstrates the difficulties 
inherent in allowing state laws to count as intellectual 
property for CDA purposes”—and in the process reiterated its 
concern about the disparate nature of putative state 
“intellectual property” laws: 
 
We note that Universal Communication 
demonstrates the difficulties inherent in 
allowing state laws to count as intellectual 
property for CDA purposes.  In that case, the 
district court struggled with the question of 
whether the “trademark dilution” claim brought 
under Florida Law counted as intellectual 
property for purposes of the CDA, and 
concluded that it was more like a defamation 




Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 423 n.7].  Rather than 
decide how to draw the line between 
defamation and trademark, the First Circuit held 
that “because of the serious First Amendment 
issues that would be raised” if Lycos were 
found liable, defendant had not violated the 
Florida statute.  Id. at 423. 
 
 The First Circuit was able to sidestep the 
question of what counted as intellectual 
property on First Amendment grounds.  But we 
cannot do so here.  States have any number of 
laws that could be characterized as intellectual 
property laws:  trademark, unfair competition, 
dilution, right of publicity and trade defamation, 
to name just a few.  Because such laws vary 
widely from state to state, no litigant will know 
if he is entitled to immunity for a state claim 
until a court decides the legal issue.  And, of 
course, defendants that are otherwise entitled to 
CDA immunity will usually be subject to the 
law of numerous states.  An entity otherwise 
entitled to § 230 immunity would thus be forced 
to bear the costs of litigation under a wide 
variety of state statutes that could arguably be 
classified as “intellectual property.”  As a 
practical matter, inclusion of rights protected by 
state law within the “intellectual property” 
exemption would fatally undermine the broad 
grant of immunity provided by the CDA. 
 
Id. at 1119 n.5.  (See also id. at 12 (“Ultimately, the [First 




not apply, the claim was properly dismissed as a matter of 
[Florida] trademark law’ ‘because of the serious First 
Amendment issues that would be raised by allowing 
[Plaintiff’s] claim.’” (quoting Univ. Commc’n, 478 F.3d at 
423 & n.7)).)        
 
Instead of simply applying its purported holding 
concerning the scope of § 230(e)(2) and state laws, the First 
Circuit subsequently assumed “without deciding” that the 
plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims “come within the 
compass of this exception.”  Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 26 (1st Cir. 2016).  It 
recognized that “[t]he application of the exemption to the 
appellants’ state law claims for the unauthorized use of 
pictures is not free from doubt.”  Id. at 26 n.9.  “At least one 
court of appeals has suggested that state law intellectual 
property claims are not covered by this exemption.  See 
[Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118-19, 1119 n.5]; but cf. Lycos, 
478 F.3d at 422-23, 324 n.7 (applying section 230(e)(2) to a 
claim under state trademark law, albeit without detailed 
analysis).”  Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 26 n.9.  In fact, 
“Backpage argues that the unauthorized use of pictures claims 
do not involve intellectual property but, rather, stem from 
property rights protected by tort law.”  Id.  Upholding the 
dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims under state law, the First 
Circuit explained that “[w]e need not reach either of these 
issues.”  Id.; see also Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 
1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that, while district court 
should have addressed § 230(e)(2) before invoking grant of 
immunity, it was unnecessary to address difficult issue of 
applying CDA because Florida right of publicity claim would 





While there may be district court cases (like Atlantic 
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009)) that have applied the intellectual property 
exception to state law claims, we are the first circuit court to 
take such a step.  The majority takes issue with Facebook’s 
assertion that its reading would increase uncertainty about the 
precise contours of immunity in cases involving purported 
state intellectual property laws.  However, the 2007 Perfect 
10 decision was the only circuit court clearly on point, and it 
kept the proverbial door closed on a potential influx of 
disparate and downright confusing state law “intellectual 
property” claims that would be contrary to Congress’s 
express goals in enacting § 230.  Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 
1118-19 & n.5.  We now open this door and, as I explain in 
more detail below, this drastic step undermines the broad 
policy objectives codified in § 230. 
 
“Facebook’s appeal to text and structure rightly urges 
us to read § 230 as an integrated whole.”  (Majority Opinion 
at 13.)  In short, the other immunity exceptions set forth under 
subsection (e) refer to only specified federal laws and, in 
certain instances, to co-extensive state laws.  Accordingly, § 
230(e)(1) states that “Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of 
this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to 
sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other 
Federal criminal statute.”  Section 230(e)(4) states that 
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the 
amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law.”  
Section 230(e)(5) provides that “Nothing in this section (other 
than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or 




section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim 
constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title,” “(B) any 
charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if 
the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a 
violation of section 1591 of Title 18,” or “(C) any charge in a 
criminal prosecution under State law if the conduct 
underlying the charge would constitute a violation of Section 
2421A of Title 18, and promotion or facilitation of 
prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s 
promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.”  Given 
such narrowly circumscribed categories, should § 230(e)(2) 
be read to apply to “any number of [disparate state] laws that 
could be characterized as intellectual property laws:  
trademark, unfair competition, dilution, right of publicity and 
trade defamation, to name just a few”—which all have 
“varying causes of action and remedies, and have varying 
purposes and policy goals,” Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118, 
1119 n.5?  Would Congress have really gone so far as to grant 
immunity from a wide range of state and federal laws—
including state criminal law—yet permit claims to go forward 
under the nebulous (and expansive) category of state 
“intellectual property”/“rights of publicity” laws?2  
 
2 In fact, counsel for Facebook points out at oral 
argument that Congress specified as part of the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2016 that the amendments made by this statute 
“shall not be construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual 
property for purposes of any other Act of Congress.”  18 
U.S.C. § 1833 Statutory Note.  In turn, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 “provides for a carefully 
balanced system of notices, takedowns, and counternotices 
[with respect to purported copyright infringement] that allows 




The majority acknowledges that “the structural 
evidence [Facebook] cites cuts both ways.”  (Majority 
Opinion at 14.)  However, the codified findings and policies 
clearly tilt the balance in Facebook’s favor.  I believe that the 
more expansive interpretation would gut the immunity system 
established by Congress and undermine the policies and 
findings that Congress chose to codify in the statute itself.     
 
The “Findings” and “Policy” explicitly set forth in § 
230(a) and (b) emphasize, inter alia, the importance of the 
Internet, its continued development, the free exchange of 
information, and the need to keep governmental regulation of 
this forum to a minimum: 
 
(a)  Findings 
 
The Congress finds the following: 
 
(1)  The rapidly developing array of Internet 
and other interactive computer services 
available to individual Americans represent an 
extraordinary advance in the availability of 
educational and informational resources to our 
citizens. 
 
(2)  These services offer users a great degree of 
control over the information that they receive, 
 
(Amicus EFF’s Brief at 17 (addressing 17 U.S.C. § 512).)   
Given these restrictions, how could one conclude that § 
230(e)(2) is applicable to a wide range of state “intellectual 




as well as the potential for even greater control 
in the future as technology develops. 
 
(3)  The Internet and other interactive services 
offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity. 
 
(4)  The Internet and other interactive computer 
services have flourished, to the benefit of all 
Americans, with a minimum of government 
regulation. 
 
(5)  Increasingly Americans are relying on 
interactive media for a variety of political, 
educational, cultural, and entertainment 
services. 
 
(b)  Policy 
 
It is the policy of the United States— 
 
(1)  to promote the continued development of 
the Internet and other interactive computer 
services and other interactive media; 
 
(2)  to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered 





(3)  to encourage the development of 
technologies which maximize user control over 
what information is received by individuals, 
families, and schools who use the Internet and 
other interactive computer services; 
 
(4)  to remove disincentives for the 
development and utilization of blocking and 
filtering technologies that empower parents to 
restrict their children’s access to objectionable 
or inappropriate online material; and 
 
(5)  to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal 
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer. 
 
§ 230(a)-(b).   
 
 “The majority of federal circuits have interpreted the 
CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of 
action that would make service providers liable for 
information originating with a third-party user of the 
service.’”  Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Almeida, 
456 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331)).  In short, 
Congress—concerned about protecting and encouraging the 
freedom of expression in a new and important forum of 
speech—meant to protect and encourage such speech 
unfettered by the burden of intrusive governmental regulation 
in the form of civil litigation and liability.  In one of the first 
cases to interpret § 230, the Fourth Circuit undertook a 
thorough and persuasive examination of the purpose of the 




concluded that § 230 barred the plaintiff’s defamation claim 
against the service provider.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.  As the 
Fourth Circuit explained, “Congress recognized the threat that 
tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and 
burgeoning Internet medium.”  Id. at 330.  “The imposition of 
tort liability on service providers for the communications of 
others represented, for Congress, simply another form of 
intrusive government regulation of speech,” and “Section 230 
was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet 
communication and, accordingly, to keep government 
interference in the medium to a minimum.”  Id. (quoting § 
230(a)(3), (a)(4), (b)(2)).  While observing that “the original 
culpable party who posts defamatory messages would [not] 
escape accountability,” the Zeran court stated that “Congress 
made a policy choice, however, not to deter harmful online 
speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on 
companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ 
potentially injurious messages.”  Id. at 330-31.  Furthermore, 
the Fourth Circuit observed that “[i]nteractive computer 
services have millions of users” and that “[t]he amount of 
information communicated via interactive computer services 
is therefore staggering.”  Id. at 331 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844, 850-51 (1997)).  The possibility of tort liability 
in such a context would have an obvious chilling effect, with 
service providers (who could not possibly screen each of their 
millions of postings) possibly forced to impose severe 
restrictions on such on-line speech.  Id.  “Congress considered 
the weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to 
immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive 
effect.”  Id. (stating that other purpose of legislation is to 
encourage providers to self-regulate dissemination of 
offensive material); see also, e.g., Universal Commc’n, 478 




should be broadly construed).   
 
 The application of § 230(e)(2) to various state 
“intellectual property” laws would be inconsistent with the 
objectives of § 230.  On the one hand, federal intellectual 
laws are relatively well established.  As Amicus EFF explains 
in some detail, “copyrights and patents are relatively clear, 
relatively knowable, and embody a longstanding balance 
between rightsholders, future creators and inventors, and the 
public at large.”3  (Amicus EFF’s Brief at 14-15.)  In turn, 
 
3  Federal patent and copyright laws:  (1) are 
specifically authorized by the Constitution, which mandates 
that such exclusive rights must “promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; (2) 
are traditionally viewed as sharing a common origins in 
Venetian monopolies from the 1400s and 1500s (see EFF’s 
Amicus Brief at 8-9 (citing Joanna Kostlyo, From Gunpowder 
to Print:  The Common Origins of Copyright & Patent, 
Privilege & Property:  Essays on the History of Copyright 
(Ronan Deazly et al. eds., 1st ed. 2010) (available at 
https://jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vjt9v.5))); (3) embody a 
fundamental bargain in which the government grants a 
limited monopoly to encourage and reward creativity and 
innovation and then provides that the public gets the benefit 
of such efforts after the monopoly’s expiration, see, e.g., 
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994) (“The 
primary objective of the Copyright Act is to encourage the 
production of original literary, artistic, and musical 
expression for the good of the public.” (citation omitted)); 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 
(1966) (“The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to 




Facebook notes that “[a] trademark is a very unique type of 
property.”  Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581 (2d 
Cir. 1990).  A trademark is defined by the Lanham Act as 
“any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof” used by a person “to identify and distinguish his or 
her goods, including a unique product, from those 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of 
the goods, even if that source is unknown.” 4  15 U.S.C. § 
1127; see also, e.g., Pirone, 894 F.2d at 581 (explaining that 
trademark is not property in ordinary sense and, like majority, 
highlighting role of consumer confusion).  On the other hand, 
 
a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”); 
(4) are limited in scope (with copyrights available for 
expressive works as set forth in the Copyright Act, see, e.g., 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-
61 (1991), and patents available for new, useful, and non-
obvious inventions concerning certain subject matter, see, 
e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
146-56 (1989); (5) involve exclusive rights that are secured 
(as the Constitution mandates) for “limited Times;” (6) are 
obviously (as federal statutes) national in application; and (7) 
are alienable, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d); 35 U.S.C. § 261.             
 
4 I note that the Ninth Circuit has ruled that § 230(e)(2)  
“does not apply to false advertising claims brought under § 
1125 of the Lanham Act, unless the claim itself involves 
intellectual property” (although it does apply to claims 
pertaining to an established intellectual property right under 
federal law, including “those inherent in a . . . trademark”).  
Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 946 
F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 13 




“state laws protecting ‘intellectual property,’ however 
defined, are by no means uniform,” with such laws bearing 
various names (e.g., trademark, unfair competition, dilution, 
and right of publicity), legal elements, remedies, and 
purposes.  Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1118-19 & n.5.  Such 
confusion is only magnified by the fact that “material on a 
website may be viewed across the Internet, and thus in more 
than one state at a time,” and “defendants that are otherwise 
entitled to CDA immunity will usually be subject to the law 
of numerous states.”  Id.  Permitting litigation and liability 
under such a tangle of disparate state law schemes would 
threaten “the continued development of the Internet” as well 
as “the vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation”—even though 
Congress found that the “Internet and other interactive 
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity” and that the Internet 
has flourished to the benefit of all Americans, “with a 
minimum of government regulation.”  § 230(a)(3), (4), (b)(1), 
(2).  In other words, the imposition of such liability would 
simply constitute “another form of intrusive government 
regulation of speech,” which Congress sought to prevent in 
the first place.  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.   
 
“This web of inconsistent state laws is the very 
definition of the ‘fettering’ state regulation that Congress 
sought to avoid in enacting Section 230.”5  (Facebook’s Brief 
 
5 The majority recognizes that Congress enacted a pro-
free-market policy.  But it contends that Facebook downplays 




at 25 (quoting § 230(b)(2)).  In fact, “right of publicity” laws 
epitomize this “web” of disparate state laws.   
 
“The appearance of near-uniformity in the adoption of 
some version of the right of publicity belies the degree to 
which the exact contours of the right differ significantly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”  Karyn A. Temple, U.S. 
Copyright Off., Authors, Attribution, and Integrity: 
Examining Moral Rights in the United States, at 115 (2019), 
https://wwww.copyright.gov/policy/moralrights/full-
report.pdf (citing Joshua L. Simmons & Miranda D. Means, 
Split Personality:  Constructing a Coherent Right of Publicity 
Statute, Landside, at 38 (May/June 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_la
w/publications/landside/2017-18/may-june/split-
personality/)).  For example, some states specifically define 
the aspects of a person’s identity that may serve as the basis 
for the claim, see, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1449(A) 
(“name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness”); 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8316(a) (“name or likeness”), while other 
states evidently bar uses that merely evoke a person, like a 
modified race car, see Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), or a celebrity 
catch-phrase, see Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 
698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).  “And while most states 
historically view the right as nondescendible, the modern 
trend holds it capable of surviving the death of the celebrity.”  
 
that “state property laws—along with contract laws—enable 
the resulting formation of effective markets.’”  (Majority 
Opinion at 15 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. 
Dist Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1029 (2021)).)  I note, however, 




Stacey L. Dugan & Mark Lemley, What the Right of 
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 
1161, 1174 (2006) (citing 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights 
of Publicity & Privacy § 9:18 (2d ed. 2005)); see also § 
8316(b)(3), (c) (providing for survival of action after person’s 
death with repose period of 30 years).  Other differences 
include whether a claim of right must be registered in order to 
pursue a posthumous claim, whether the claimant must live in 
the state whose law he or she wishes to invoke, and whether 
the claimant needs to prove sufficient fame or show that his 
or her persona has economic value.  Temple, supra, at 115-16; 
see also, e.g., § 8316(a) (“[a]ny natural person whose name or 
likeness has commercial value”).      
 
These differences are not surprising given the 
confusion that exists regarding the specific basis of the right 
of publicity.  “In enacting right of publicity statutes, 
commentators have noted that many states struggled to adopt 
a strong, consistent theory of why the right exists and what it 
should be designed to protect.”  Temple, supra, at 115 n.652 
(quoting Simmons & Means, supra, at 38).  Amicus SAG-
AFTRA acknowledges that the right of publicity “derived 
originally from laws protecting one’s privacy.”  (Amicus 
SAG-AFTRA’s Brief at 18.)  Especially when compared with 
patent and copyright laws, this area of the law is relatively 
new.  See, e.g., Dugan & Lemley, supra, at 1167 (“Before the 
late nineteenth century, individuals had little recourse against 
the use of their names or images by unauthorized parties.”).  
As the law review article cited by the majority indicated, the 
right had its origins in the famous 1890 law review article by 
Samuel Warren and future Justice Louis Brandeis proposing a 
new “Right to Privacy.”  Id. at 1167-68 (citing Samuel D. 




L. Rev. 193 (1890)).  “Although their article occasionally 
strayed into broad generalities suggesting that individuals 
should have property rights in their personalities, their 
proposed cause of action focused narrowly on the problem at 
hand:  ‘to protect the privacy of private life.’”  Id. at 1168-69 
(quoting Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 215).  Accordingly, § 
625C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that 
“[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or 
likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for 
invasion of privacy.”  While recognizing that the right is in 
the nature of a property right, Comment a to this section goes 
on to state that “the protection of his personal feelings against 
mental distress is an important factor leading to a recognition 
of the rule.”6  See also Corabi v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 273 A.2d 
899, 918 (Pa. 1971) (addressing Restatement), abrogation on 
other grounds recognized by Am. Future Sys. v. Better Bus. 
Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389 (Pa. 2007).  Furthermore, it is 
clear that, at least in certain states, the right of publicity is 
particularly broad in nature—and certainly broader than the 
purported federal counterparts.7  See, e.g., White v. Samsung 
 
6 Hepp similarly alleged (as the majority recognizes) 
that her likeness was used to promote a dating service, 
thereby misappropriating the effort she spent to build a 
valuable reputation (which could confuse consumers by 
suggesting that she endorses the service).  However, she also 
alleged that “Defendants’ sexualization of Plaintiff’s image 
and use for prurient and illicit purposes is abhorrent and 
disgusting.”  (A61.) 
 
7 Amicus EFF asserts that, “despite the Supreme 
Court’s rough analogy in [Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 




Elec. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from order rejecting suggestion for 
rehearing en banc) (“[I]t’s now a tort for advertisers to remind 
the public of a celebrity.  Not to use a celebrity’s name, voice, 
signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity endorses a 
product; but simply to evoke the celebrity’s image in the 
public’s mind.  This Orwellian notion withdraws far more 
from the public domain than prudence and common sense 
allow.  It conflicts with the Copyright Act and the Copyright 
Clause.  It raises serious First Amendment problems.  It’s bad 
law, and it deserves a long, hard second look.”).   
 
publicity on the one hand and patents and copyrights on the 
other hand], it is hard to see how publicity rights fulfill any 
public interest in promoting creativity or invention, rather 
than a general interest in protecting people against unfair 
commercial exploitation and unwanted attention.”  (Amicus 
EFF’s Brief at 13.)  “Celebrities do not need any special 
incentive to have a public identity, nor do regular people.”  
(Id.)  Dugan and Lemley likewise rejected this 
“incentive/copyright model” for right of publicity claims.  
Dugan & Lemley, supra, at 1186-90.   According to them, 
there was no empirical evidence to show that celebrities 
would invest less energy and talent in becoming famous 
without a publicity right, id. at 1187-88, and, in any event, “it 
is not at all clear that society should want to encourage fame 
for fame’s sake,” id. at 1188 (footnote omitted) (“Unlike 
copyright law—which aims to promote the production of 
valuable works of authorship that enhance the quality of 
discourse and understanding in our society—the right of 
publicity rewards those who, with luck, hard work, or 
accident of birth, happen to join the ranks of the famous.” 





The majority attempts to limit the scope and effect of 
its ruling.  Accordingly, it contends that its holding neither 
threatens free speech nor opens the proverbial floodgates.  
“And we express no opinion as to whether other states’ rights 
of publicity qualify as intellectual property as a matter of 
federal law.”  (Majority Opinion at 22.)  The majority 
likewise offers no opinion about Hepp’s Pennsylvania 
common law claim. 
 
However, this decision—which it bears repeating is 
the first circuit court ruling to hold that the intellectual 
property exception applies to state “intellectual property” 
laws (specifically including at least one state’s right of 
publicity statute) and in the process to reject the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Perfect 10—does threaten to open the 
floodgates.  Internet service providers now face the prospect 
that so troubled the Ninth Circuit—“Because such laws vary 
widely from state to state, no litigant will know if he is 
entitled to immunity for a state claim until a court decides the 
legal issue.”  Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119 n.5.  In this case, 
Facebook does not even know whether Hepp’s common law 
right of publicity claim falls under § 230(e)(2).  Such 
uncertainty as well as the probability of additional litigation 
in the future together with the real possibility of being held 
liable under disparate and often very expansive state law 
“intellectual property” regimes would encourage internet 
service providers to censor more content—even though 
Congress “recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose 
to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet 
medium,” enacted § 230 “to maintain the robust nature of 
Internet communication, and, accordingly, to keep 




made the policy choice “not to deter online speech through 
the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that 
serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious 
messages.”  Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31.  The fact that 
“defendants that are otherwise entitled to CDA immunity will 
usually be subject to the law of numerous states,” Perfect 10, 
388 F.3d at 1119 n.5, only further compounds the pressure to 
restrict speech.   
 
 Section 230 “paved the way for a robust new forum for 
public speech as well as ‘a trillion-dollar industry centered 
around user-generated content.’”  Bennett v. Google, LLC, 
882 F.3d 1163, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Eric Goldman 
& Jeff Kosseff, Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of 
Internet Law’s Most Important Judicial Decision, The 
Recorder (Nov. 10, 2017), perma.cc/RR2M-UZ2M).  The 
Internet has seen “staggering” growth since the 1990s.  (See, 
e.g., Amicus SAG-AFTRA’s Brief at 16-17 (noting that there 
were about 40 million Internet users in 1997 but that, in 2020, 
there are roughly 4.66 billion users).)  Even Hepp 
acknowledges that “it may be true that the protections 
afforded Internet-based Internet companies under § 230 of the 
CDA initially played a crucial role in creating what is now the 
modern Internet.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 16-17; see also id. at 
16 (“In 2007, when Perfect 10 was decided, the Internet with 
its concomitant limitless potential for opening portals for 
commerce, public discourse, science, education and other 
areas, was in its adolescence.”).)  The parties and their 
respective amici dispute whether the protections of § 230 are 
still necessary and whether the negative consequences of 
immunity in this context (continue to) outweigh its positive 
effects (including whether or not the technology necessary to 




available).  However, these are all matters for Congress—and 
not the courts—to address.   
 
Under the circumstances, I have no choice but to 
follow the Ninth Circuit’s example and conclude that § 
230(e)(2) is limited to federal intellectual property laws 
and—at most—state laws only where they are co-extensive 
with such federal laws.  Because Pennsylvania’s right of 
publicity law clearly is not co-extensive with federal 
intellectual property law,8 I would affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of Hepp’s claims against Facebook as well as its 
denial of the motion to amend with respect to NKL. 
 
8 Although the majority compares the right of publicity 
to patent, copyright, and (especially) trademark rights, they 
clearly are not the same thing. 
